Toward a Semasiological account of Evidentials : an Enounciative Approach of -er in Modern Western Armenian by Donabedian-Demopoulos, Anaid
Toward a Semasiological account of Evidentials : an
Enounciative Approach of -er in Modern Western
Armenian
Anaid Donabedian-Demopoulos
To cite this version:
Anaid Donabedian-Demopoulos. Toward a Semasiological account of Evidentials : an Enoun-
ciative Approach of -er in Modern Western Armenian. Journal of Pragmatics, Elsevier, 2001,
pp.421-442. <halshs-00554746>
HAL Id: halshs-00554746
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00554746
Submitted on 1 Aug 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOWARDS A SEMASIOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF EVIDENTIALS: AN 
ENUNCIATIVE APPROACH OF –ER IN MODERN WESTERN ARMENIAN 
 
Anaïd Donabédian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modern Western Armenian1 (henceforth MWA) has a specific form of completed past 
whose semantic values are similar to those which have helped found the notion of 
evidentiality in languages such as Turkish, Albanian, and Bulgarian. Although the facts of 
Armenian are comparable to those described for the above cited languages, our primary 
aim is to examine the formal marker associated with evidentiality in MWA as observed in 
a corpus of spontaneous speech. In so doing, we will reveal certain shortcomings of 
established theories on evidentiality. Going beyond the description of a particular 
language, we will address a number of methodological issues concerning the status of the 
notion of evidentiality in the description of natural languages and will call into question 
some more or less explicit theoretical presuppositions of the typological approach. Our 
alternative analysis is based on enunciative2 and discursive criteria. 
 
1. The MWA data 
 
1.2. The evidential marker in the verbal system of MWA 
 
The phenomena observed in MWA coincide with those found in descriptions of Balkan 
and Caucasian languages, commonly considered prime examples of languages with 
evidential markings (e.g. Turkish, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Albanian and Georgian). 
Before addressing the issues of the semantic and pragmatic values associated with the 
evidential category, we will first determine its morphosyntactic status within the MWA 
verb system3, which will allow us to determine the position of MWA among the 
languages marking evidentiality. 
1. The evidential marker in MWA is a verbal form analogous to the perfect, but while in 
the perfect we find the participle in –ac (sir-ac en4, love-PFT AUX3PL, ‘they have 
loved’), the evidential has a specific non-finite form in –er (sir-er en, love-EVID 
AUX3PL, ‘they have loved (EVID))’. Thus, while in Persian, Eastern Armenian5 and 
even to some extent in Bulgarian6, ‘evidential’, having no specific marker, may just 
be a label for some contextual meanings of the perfect, in MWA perfect and 
evidential forms are always distinct synchronically, even though the form in –er is a 
diachronical development of the perfect in Classical Armenian. Thus, it is clear that in 
MWA, the evidential constitutes a morphosyntactic category. Moreover, the marker 
is reduced to the binary opposition marked vs. unmarked, in contrast with Tibetan, 
Korean, Caribbean languages7 and other languages where the values of the evidential 
are distributed among a paradigm of markers. 
2. Due to its historical origin, this marker only exists in the completed past8, realized as 
a non-finite form of the verb (in –er) associated with the auxiliary ‘to be’, and hence 
as a variant of the perfect or past perfect9. In this respect MWA is close to Turkish 
and Bulgarian, but distinct from Albanian, where the evidential is compatible with all 
forms of the verbal paradigm. 
3. Without prejudging its modal status, we note that the MWA evidential is not 
compatible with non-actualized modes. All other compound verb forms allow (in 
appropriate contexts) the alternation between the actualized present form of the 
auxiliary, em, and its non-actualized (known as ‘subjunctive’) counterpart ëllam. This 
possibility is not available for the form in –er. Yet it is not incompatible with 
subordination: nominal and adverbial subordinate clauses can have evidential 
predicates (cf. infra (9) and (10)). 
4. No combination of person or number renders the use of the evidential 
ungrammatical, in contrast to what is observed in Korean and Tibetan. 
 
1.2. Semantico-pragmatic values of the evidential in MWA 
 
An examination of our corpus shows that the values considered characteristic of the 
evidential in Turkish, Bulgarian and Albanian are also expressed by the –er form in 
MWA. We begin with the most typical values and illustrate them with examples 
analogous to those often used in descriptions of neighboring languages. 
 
• Hearsay: 
The evidential is often found in utterances where the speaker transmits information he or 
she has heard10: 
(1) Μaro−n amowsnac’−er ê! 
 [Maro-ARTDÉF marry-EVID AUX3SG] 
 ‘ Maro has got married (so I heard) !’ 
 
Even when the source of information is neither identified nor recoverable, such 
utterances can have a polyphonous flavor or indicate that the speaker distances himself 
from the truth of his proposition. It should be noted that this value is the first informants 
mention when asked about the meanings of the form in –er. It is also the interpretation 
most often proposed by informants in the absence of specific contextual or intonational 
clues. 
 
• Inference 
[On going out, the speaker, unaware that it had been raining, sees that the ground is wet] 
 (2) Αnj’rew ek−er ê  
  [Rain come-EVID AUX3SG] 
 ‘ (Look), it has rained ! (rain has come)’ 
 
In a similar context, French would express this value by the use of ‘tiens!’ in combination 
with a passé composé. The context of the utterance suggests that the assertion about the 
rain is based on the observation that the ground is wet, i.e. based on a trace of the event. 
For this reason, this value has often been equated with a logical process of inference11. 
One could wonder, however, whether the inference is not triggered by the context rather 
than by the form in –er. This particular value can (but need not) be accompanied by 
exclamatory intonation. This is consistent with the fact that the event is asserted 
simultaneously with the speaker’s becoming aware of it (new information). Using the 
perfect to refer to the same factual situation is not impossible, but would require a more 
elaborate context in which the notion of rain had already been introduced (the speaker 
expected it to rain, rain had been forecast, the speaker wondered whether it would rain, 
etc.). 
 
• Surprise (also called ‘mirative’) 
 
[Two old friends come across one another in the street. One of them is with his daughter, whom the 
other has not seen for some years.] 
 (3) Αγj’ik−d ê ? Μecc’−er ê / 
 [Daughter-POSS2SG be? Grow-EVID AUX3SG] 
 ‘Is that your daughter? (How) she has grown!’ 
 
This value requires exclamatory intonation. The speaker is surprised that the girl has 
grown so much, as he expected her to be smaller. The use of the evidential is motivated 
by the discrepancy between the speaker’s expectations and the actual situation. In 
general, this value is tied to (positive) evaluative predicates, which is why it has been 
labeled admirative in descriptions of Albanian. However, it is equally compatible with 
pejorative predicates (Gerc’er ê, ‘How much weight she’s put on!’). Note that this value 
combines the contextual constraints of the so-called inferential value (a situation in which 
the speaker has to become aware of a past situation for which he was not prepared) and 
purely intonational constraints (the exclamatory intonation is the main defining 
characteristic of this value). 
In the same situational context the perfect in –ac would not express surprise, but rather 
fulfillment of an expectation (‘Indeed, she has grown’). It would be possible as an answer 
to the question: ‘Well, do you think my daughter has changed?’. In this case, the 
pragmatic force of the answer Μecc’−ac ê is merely to specify the semantic content of a 
predicate already predicated of the subject in the context (‘she has changed’). 
 
• A continuum of values 
As soon as we turn our attention to utterances in context, it becomes clear that the 
threefold distinction sketched above is not always easy to use. In fact, the assignment of 
an utterance to one of the categories is often indeterminate, as has been shown by Aksu-
Koç & Slobin (1986) in their discussion of the Turkish example Ahmed gelmi, ‘Ahmed 
has come-EVID’, which, according to context, can be glossed as either ‘Ahmed has 
come, I was told’, ‘I see his coat, so Ahmed has come’, or ‘I didn’t expect him to come, 
but Ahmed has come’. 
The following Armenian example (excerpted from a novel) also allows multiple 
interpretations of the evidential: 
(4) Petros anmij’apês zayn lr’ec’owc’, ew katakov lec’own xstowt’eamb më ësaw: 
− Do Ηrač, ësê nayim, as k’ow ëracd kë vaylê? norên čočowx më ownec’−er 
es?  
          [again? child-ARTINDEF have-EVID AUX2SG] 
‘Petros silences him and says with feigned serenity : So, Hratch, tell me, is this 
the kind of thing one does?  You’ve had (EVID) yet another child ? 
(Chahnour) 
 
Even though the context suggests an interpretation of the evidential as mildly ironic or 
reproaching (‘one does not do that!’), it is still possible to interpret this example as an 
instance of hearsay (‘I heard that…’), inference (‘I see that…’), or surprise (‘What?, 
Really?’) without any of these interpretations excluding the others. In this example, the 
ring of reproach is triggered by explicitly mentioned material (‘Is this the kind of thing 
one does?’), but, as shown in (5), the evidential in –er can evoke this idea all by itself, in 
contrast to the perfect in –ac. 
 
• The argumentative value 
The importance of the context in determining the value of an evidential as well as the 
fuzziness of the boundaries between the different values clearly show that these same 
values are not an exhaustive definition of the category. Furthermore we note that the 
inventory of values given so far is incomplete. The ‘reproach’ interpretation, which 
appears as a secondary value in (4) can also be the primary value of the evidential, as in: 
 
[A mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law live in the same house. One afternoon the mother-in-law 
passes by her daughter-in-law’s room and sees her sleeping. A friend comes over for a cup of coffee and 
asks where the daughter-in-law is.] 
(5a)  Par’k−er ê  
[lie down-EVID be-3SG] 
‘She’s lying down’ (understood : it’s shocking how lazy she is) 
 (5b) Par’k−ac ê 
[lie down-PFT be-3SG] 
‘She’s lying down’ (understood that this is normal, e.g. she usually rests 
at this time of day, she’s pregnant, she’s ill, etc.) 
 
This example shows that the interpretation of ‘reproach’ or ‘argumentative value’ should 
be added to the inventory of semantico-pragmatic values of the evidential. This is a 
relatively new proposal, as this value has not generally been counted among the central 
ones in general descriptions of the evidential. Nonetheless, it is not particular to 
Armenian: Duchet & Përnaska (1996:40-41) cite Albanian examples to which they 
attribute a value of ‘reprise polémique’. Likewise, Meydan (1996:134) discusses ‘des 
nuances exprimant le doute, la méfiance, l’ironie, la dénégation, l’indignation’ for 
Turkish. This range of values thus seems to be intrinsically linked to the category of 
evidentials. 
In the next section we will examine to what extent the treatment of evidentiality in both 
general and typological linguistics can do justice to the Armenian data. 
 
2. The notion evidentiality: 
 
• Form and meaning 
In each of the languages we have mentioned, data similar to those cited above have been 
given different labels: indeterminate past, admirative, testimonial and constative in 
traditional grammatical descriptions, and, more recently, evidential and mediative. 
Furthermore, it is well-known that certain Amerindian languages, such as Tuyuca and 
Hopi, make use of a specific morpheme marking whether the speaker has obtained the 
information s/he asserts by direct perception (either visual or auditory), hearsay, or 
logical deduction. Since analogous phenomena are attested in languages that are 
genetically and typologically very distant (Tibetan, Turkish, Bulgarian, Korean, 
Georgian, etc.), it has been suggested that this category, which Jakobson (1956) dubbed 
evidential, could be generalized and that ‘knowledge source’ could be considered as a 
linguistic category in its own right, as much in general as in typological linguistics: 
 
“Evidentials refer to the source of information which forms the basis of what we 
are saying. Do we know what we are saying because we have witnessed it with 
our own eyes, or because we have heard it from someone ? Did we deduce our 
information from some sort of evidence, or is it just generally true ?” Van Valin 
& LaPolla (1997:43) 
 
As soon as general linguistics realizes the importance of the notion of evidentiality, it 
tends to prefer an onomasiological approach to the category: one first posits the 
existence of the category and then investigates how it is realized in different languages. 
According to Chafe & Nichols (1986:VII), this category 
 
“shows us much about what we might regard as ‘natural epistomology’, the way 
in which ordinary people, unhampered by philosophical traditions, naturally 
regard the source and reliability of their knowledge. Simultaneously, we can 
learn a great deal about an important ingredient of language itself.” 
 
The title of the volume from which this quote is taken, Evidentiality–The Linguistic 
Coding of Epistemology, clearly reflects a position which dominates most of the work on 
the category (e.g. Guentchéva 1996, Kozintseva 1994, Dendale & Tasmowski 1994, Van 
der Auwera & Plungian 1988 etc.) and which stresses the cognitive dimension12 of 
evidentiality. In most of this work the relation between form and meaning is not central 
and even when works as Dendale & Tasmowski (1994:3) refer to the form, their 
requirements remain vague : 
 
“De toutes les fonctions qu’on reconnaît au langage, une des plus importantes 
est de transmettre de l’information. Cette information peut provenir de sources 
variées (…). Ces considérations tiennent leur pertinence linguistique du fait qu’il 
arrive au locuteur, au moment de produire un énoncé, d’y inscrire 
linguistiquement la provenance de l’information transmise. Il marque alors dans 
son énoncé la source du savoir que cet énoncé est censé communiquer. Dès lors 
que la langue dispose de moyens morphologiques et lexicaux spécialisés pour 
indiquer les sources de l’information qu’on communique, ces sources et ces 
moyens deviennent des objets d’investigation susceptibles d’intéresser le 
linguiste.” 
 
Guentchéva (1996) is noteworthy in that it is one of the rare works that make a clear 
terminological distinction between the grammaticalized evidential, i.e. a specific formally 
identifiable marker in a given language (French: “le médiatif13”), and epistemic modal 
meanings of periphrastic verb forms evoked by non-specialized markers and contextual 
elements (“l’énonciation médiatisée14”). Most linguists working from a general 
typological perspective, e.g. Van Valin & LaPolla (1997), Van der Auwera & Plungian 
(1998), do not make this distinction. However, as long as no explicit account is 
presented of the formal characteristics (i.e. grammaticalized vs. periphrastic forms) of 
these categories in natural languages, it is hard to see how one could ligitimize the claim 
that languages ‘encode’ a particular category. As a result, the claim that languages 
encode the ‘source of knowledge’ is a claim about a morphosyntactic category for those 
languages where the evidential has been grammaticalized, and a claim about a semantico-
pragmatic category for those languages where this semantic value is triggered only in 
certain contexts and cannot be attributed to a particular marker or a series of markers. 
Such an interpretation brings about a second problem. Are ‘knowledge’ and the 
processes by which it is acquired (perception, reasoning, or still others) directly relevant 
to understanding linguistic activity, or are they merely contextual elements indirectly 
reflected in utterances? We believe that one of the ways to gain access to language 
understanding is to account for the ways in which the languages of the world organize 
concepts into formal systems. Thus, from a heuristic viewpoint, it is essential to posit a 
priori that language activity does not merely consist in verbalizing thought, but also in 
introducing a propositional content into a complex system of enunciative (and not merely 
referential) coordinates. In other words, we believe that, apart from contributing to a 
purely interdisciplinary and otherwise legitimate research area, the cognitive approach, 
rather than analysing the specifically linguistic nature of the markers examined, analyses 
the contexts in which they can appear. From the descriptive viewpoint, then, the 
cognitive approach, may foster the illusion of the cognitive iconicity of language, and 
obscure the true nature of linguistic categories. Friedman (1986:188) is one of the rare 
authors to raise this question, introducing the ‘speaker’s attitude’ criterion : 
 
“In the languages under discussion [Bulgarian, Albanian, Macedonian], 
evidentiality does not constitute a generic category on a level with, for example, 
mood, tense or aspect. Rather, evidentiality is a meaning, whether contextual or 
invariant, expressed by the generic grammatical category which indicates the 
speaker's attitude toward the narrated event.” 
 
Examination of data from the languages mentioned, as well as from Armenian and 
Turkish15 shows that the cognitive theories are unable to predict accurately whether an 
evidential will be used, given a particular context. Moreover, they hold that direct 
(especially visual) perception of the asserted information is incompatible with evidential 
marking. Yet, in example (5), the fact that the mother-in-law has herself seen that her 
daughter-in-law is asleep, does not prevent her from using an evidential. 
Thus, it seems to us essential that a general theory of evidentiality be based on rigorous 
morphosyntactic analysis, conducted from a semasiological viewpoint: starting from a 
particular form, we investigate the set of values it expresses in relation to the 
morphosyntactic oppositions of which it is part. 
Granted that the onomasiological approach is indispensible to any serious comparative or 
typological study, in order to be legitimate, it has to be based on and constantly called 
into question by semasiological studies of particular languages. 
 
• Evidential vs. mirative 
Our criticism of the notion ‘source of knowledge’ in the description of evidentiality is not 
entirely new. Many researches have stressed the need to distinguish between the 
evidential as it is found in certain Amerindian languages and in Tibetan on the one hand, 
and the marker originating from an older perfect form in what we call Balkan-Caucasian 
languages on the other hand. The latter marker is typically described as having three 
values: hearsay16, inference (these two often cited as central, hence the link to the notion 
of evidentiality) and surprise or admirative. These authors (Aksu & Slobin 1982, 1986; 
Baturk, Danon-Boileau & Morel 1996; DeLancey 1997) have emphasized the primacy 
of the surprise or admirative value and have shown that the crucial value in these 
languages has nothing to do with ‘source of knowledge’. DeLancey applies the term 
evidential-like to this category, which he describes (1997:33) as follows: “The 
fundamental function of the category is to mark sentences which report information 
which is new or surprising to the speaker, regardless of whether the information source is 
first- or second-hand.” 
In distinguishing the admirative from the evidential, DeLancey avoids some of the 
problems the notion of evidentiality can give rise to. Yet, he cannot avoid all of them. In 
fact, he consistently makes use of notions which are more cognitive than linguistic: the 
linguistic message is still seen as reporting a piece of information, and the reliability of 
it’s source has to be measured. 
The main merits of this kind of analysis are that (i) it uses notions which are more purely 
linguistic in that they take into account the speaker’s position (the opposition between 
old and new information introduced in DeLancey (1986) cannot be reduced to objective 
(perceptual) referential parameters such as seen vs. not seen); (ii) it aims at a unified 
description of the category without having recourse to the notion of ‘reconstructing a 
(process of) judgment’, since this notion cannot account for all uses. 
But the notion of new information conveyed by the concept of ‘surprise’ is subject to 
what we call the ‘referential illusion’: it runs the risk of being taken literally. As shown by 
the Armenian examples, the evidential marker is not rendered ungrammatical when the 
information is already known to the speaker. What happens in such contexts is simply the 
activation of another value. This shows that surprise, like source of information, is a 
value derived from a common operation which probably needs to be described in more 
abstract terms. 
The notion of ‘sideration’ (‘sidération’) coined by Basturk et al. has the merit of escaping 
from the referential illusion, since it is entirely centered on the speaker17. However, it 
cannot account for the important argumentative value. 
 
3. Towards an enunciative interpretation of evidentiality 
In work done jointly with Christine Bonnot (Bonnot et al. 1997; Bonnot & Donabédian 
1999) and based on the principles outlined above, we have used relatively abstract 
notions in trying to develop a hypothesis that captures the fundamental operation 
common to all uses of the marker. Starting from this common operation, all the different 
attested values should be predictable considering contextual, lexical, aspectual and 
intonational parameters18. 
In our respective works on the evidential in MWA (Donabédian 1996a, 1996b) and on 
Russian sentences with initial stress19 (Bonnot & Seliverstova 1995), we noted that in 
both languages these utterances, although formally marked in a very different way, tend 
to appear in similar contexts with analogous values. The novelty of the work done with 
Bonnot to follow up on this observation lies in the method adopted: we manipulated a 
number of utterances and their contexts from corpora in both languages and presented 
them to native speakers in order to establish the similarities and differences between both 
markers. We found that the differences could be explained by the fact that in MWA, the 
marker is limited to the completed past, whereas in Russian it is available in all types of 
utterances. The comparison of these phenomena in two different languages (no one has 
ever posited the existence of either an evidential category or a marker of the source of 
knowledge for Russian) led us to look for a common basis that could explain the 
convergence of these pragmatic values in both languages. It became clear that the values 
associated with the marker in MWA are fare more diverse than what is covered by 
descriptions based on the evidential hypothesis, which cannot account for values such as 
the argumentative, causal, appreciative, free indirect speech etc.20, even though these 
cannot simply be regarded as marginal. 
We will first summarize the hypothesis developed in Bonnot, Donabédian & Seliverstova 
(1997) and Bonnot & Donabédian (1999) before confronting it with a type of data we 
have not used so far, viz. a corpus of recorded spontaneous speech. 
 
3.1. Bonnot & Donabédian (1997,1999) 
 
Our contrastive research on MWA and Russian has led us to postulate an operation 
underlying the use of the evidential marker, which can be characterized as follows: 
Consider a type of assertion we will provisionally label ‘typical’21: the speaker has at 
his/her disposal a propositional content that already obtains before utterance time, in 
other words a piece of old information which has already been integrated into his/her 
background knowledge (or which, to put it in still other terms, is stable in the sense that 
its contents and truth value have already been determined) and communicates this to the 
hearer. In contrast to this type of assertion, utterances with the evidential marker, 
although equally assertive, are characterized by the fact that when the speaker validates 
(or presents as true) his propositional content P (or whatever relationship s/he establishes 
between subject and predicate) s/he simultaneously discards a competing propositional 
content (P’) (in this case not-P) which is also activated in the context. 
In other words, the truth value of P (what is reported using the evidential) is not called 
into question, but is given a contrastive flavor. 
This contrastiveness does not bear on one of the arguments of the utterance, as in focus 
constructions, but rather on the relationship between subject and predicate itself—which 
is consistent with the evidential’s status as a verbal marker—and thus directs us towards 
an interpretation which is modal rather than referential. 
As a result, utterances using the evidential may, in contrast to assertions that 
communicate a stable piece of information, be entirely deprived of informational value 
(cf. (2), (3), (6) et seq.). In Jakobson’s terminology, these are utterances where the 
conative and expressive functions far outweigh the referential function.  
The diversity of values utterances marked with the evidential can take on derives mainly 
from the diversity of modes in which P and (P’) can be present. In (2) and (3), both P 
and (P’) are part of the speaker’s knowledge pool, but (P’) corresponds to an earlier 
state of consciousness which the speaker, in the light of an unanticipated situation, can 
no longer regard as adequate. Nonetheless, the choice to express P with an evidential 
marker clearly introduces this propositional content (P’) which the speaker, even though 
he does not assert it, cannot entirely remove from his/her knowledge pool. This is what 
triggers the mirative values (surprise etc.). It is equally possible to have a context where 
(P’) is part of some generally accepted norm (deriving e.g. from socio-cultural codes or 
common world knowledge). This explains the value judgment underlying the 
interpretation of (5): the mother-in-law asserts P (‘she’s asleep’), but suggests that there 
is a contradictory viewpoint (P’) (‘a young woman should not sleep during the day, that 
is the norm’). Finally, when (P’) is part of the hearer’s knowledge pool (or presented as 
such by the speaker), this gives rise to the argumentative values observed in (6) and 
following. 
It is only when nothing in either the context or the situation allows identification of (P’) 
that the evidential takes on the hearsay interpretation: in this case, the opposition 
between (P’) and P invoked by the evidential can only be interpreted in terms of the 
speaker distancing himself from the validity of his utterance (‘I assert P, but as far as I 
know, P’ could be true) either by invoking a third party (hearsay), or by casting doubt on 
the truth of P (cf. (1)). Our corpus shows, however, that the latter two values cannot be 
regarded as basic to the category: examples like (6) most often do not confer doubt or 
distancing on the part of the speaker, though they clearly belong to the same category 
from a formal viewpoint. 
This being the case, one might wonder why both traditional grammars and native speaker 
responses tend to interpret the evidential mainly as a marker of hearsay or doubt. It 
seems to us that the absence of strict contextual and intonational constraints for this 
value accounts for the fact that it is easily turned to in metalanguage, out of context. The 
other values, even if they are more frequent, require a more elaborate scenario and are 
therefore less likely to occur when native speakers reflect on their language out of 
context. Nonetheless, we do not believe that this is sufficient reason to claim that hearsay 
and doubt are among the most typical values of the evidential marker. 
 
3.2. Confronting the hypothesis with a corpus of spontaneous speech 
 
An examination of the Kasparian corpus (1982-90)22 has allowed us to confirm our 
hypothesis. First, it shows that in discourse, the degree of informativeness of evidentially 
marked utterances is mostly marginal, not to say non-existent, and that the truth value of 
P is not directly affected by the evidential. 
 
[Three students are fixing a bicycle. After having worked some time in silence, A, who conducts the 
repairs, is getting slightly irritated and says to B, who is trying to hold the bicycle still] (S.K. 1/209) 
(6) Okay, es br’ner em, jgê, jgê down, kec’ir nayink’:::   
   [I take-EVID AUX1SG] 
  ‘Okay, I’ve got (EVID) it, (you) let go, let go, wait, let’s see…’  
 
Here, the fact that the speaker has got the bicycle is visible to all participants. Even 
thought the context is limited (the utterance is isolated, framed by silences), the situation 
can explain the use of the evidential: A is holding the bicycle (while fixing it) but sees 
that B is blocking it. Thus he asserts es br’ner em (P = ‘I’ve got it’, which 
pragmatically corresponds to ‘It won’t fall’) with the evidential introducing a content 
(P’) attributed to B (‘the bicycle can fall so I must hold it’). This is confirmed by the 
injunction ‘Let go’ and by the marked contrast between the 1st (es) and 2nd (down) 
person pronoun subjects23. Here, P and (P’) are entertained by the speaker and hearer 
respectively, which yields the argumentative value. 
 
[Bicycle repair scene: they are looking for the right wrench but cannot seem to find it. Without much 
conviction, B comes forward with a wrench that obviously will not do] (S.K. 1/431) 
 (7) B. - This one ?  
A. − Gter êir k’ič ar’aj’ vis më  
[find-EVID AUX-PAST2SG] 
  -‘But you (had) found (EVID) one, just a second ago.’ 
  B. − Va;y j’γers::: j’γers   
 -‘Oh, my nerves, my nerves !’ 
A. − K’ič ar’aj’ vis më gter êir  
   [find-EVID AUX-PAST2SG]  
 -‘Just a second ago, you (had) found (EVID) one.’  
   
Here, too, the utterance containing the evidential does not add any new information. The 
evidential has an adversative function (apparent in the translation ‘but’). Like B, A 
knows that this wrench will not do, and this exasperates B. Here, the idea that there is no 
right wrench is entertained by B, as is clear from his subsequent reply “my nerves, my 
nerves!”. In reminding B that earlier, the right wrench had been found, A posits its 
existence P and thus introduces a propositional content contradicting B’s opinion (P’). In 
this case, the context strongly favors the use of –er and it would have to be altered 
signicantly in order for the perfect in –ac to become plausible, e.g. by switching to the 3d 
person (so that the information could be unknown to B) or by contrastively focusing on 
one of the utterance’s arguments rather than on the entire predicative relation (‘you had 
found one here’). 
 
[Same situation; A jerks back a part that had already been fixed] (S.K. 1/718) 
(8) B. – What are you doing? Don’t break it again!   
A. – Αrtên awrower ê norên  
  [already break-EVID AUX3SG again] 
 - ‘It is already broken (EVID) again !’ 
 
B fears that A is ruining the bike. A asserts that the part in question is broken again P, 
taking into account the fact that B believes the opposite (P’). The assignment of P and 
(P’) to speaker and hearer respectively, again triggers an adversative value. Here too, the 
specifics of the context hardly allow alternation with –ac. Yet, leaving out norên, ‘again’ 
would make use of the perfect in –ac possible with an interpretation under which ‘it is 
already broken’ is known by all participants. 
 
Thus, in (6), (7) and (8), the propositional content of the utterance containing the 
evidential is already shared by the discourse participants and the evidential does not 
affect the truth value of P: it is the speaker who takes on the responsibility for the 
propositional content he is asserting and for its truth value. But he does this in order to 
argue, rather than provide information. 
Neither the notion ‘source of knowledge’ nor the ‘mirative’ hypothesis—both of which 
are centered around the notion of information—can account for the way these examples 
function in the discourse. Most of the time, the speaker shows his stance towards a fact 
present in the situation or towards an attitude of the hearer. The argumentative, 
contrastive and adversative values, which no traditional description takes into account 
and which no available theory can explain, is quite frequent in our corpus (about 30% of 
–er utterances). In (9), it even occurs in a subordinate clause: 
 
[A young couple is lazing in bed one morning. They are a bit edgy. He is reading a magazine that she 
has already read. Knowing that she normally likes to keep the numerology pages, he asks] (S.K. 9/51) 
 (9)  He:  - You want to keep the numerology pages? 
  She:  - If you can, and if you will, go ahead, keep them! 
  He: -Εt’ê kardac’er es nê čem paher, et’ê čes kardac’ac ëë k’ez t’oγ ëllay 
nowêr   [if read-EVID AUX2SG ]   
‘If you have read (EVID) them, I won’t keep them ; if you haven’t (PFT), ehm, 
okay, I’ll give them to you as a present.’ 
 
It is clear that she wants him to keep the pages but that she does not want to ask a favor 
of him. In using the evidential, he is invoking a hypothesis P (linked to a refusal: ‘if 
you’ve read them, I won’t keep them’) which he knows to be contradictory to the wish 
(P’) he attributes to his interlocutor. Note that the consensual hypothesis (‘if you haven’t 
read them, I’ll give them to you’), invoked in the second part of the utterance, is 
expressed using a perfect rather than an evidential. Moreover, the evidential in the first 
part (‘if you’ve read it’) entails the explicit mention of the alternative (‘if you haven’t 
read it’), which would not be the case if a perfect in –ac were used. 
 
Elsewhere, this spoken corpus confirms the enunciative constraints on theme/rheme 
segmentation we discussed in Bonnot et al. (1998). There, we claimed that these 
utterances cannot be segmented into theme and rheme by a pause24. The reason is that 
what is turned into one of the terms of the contrastive opposition P/(P’) is the entire 
predicative relation, which is viewed as a whole and can therefore not be split into theme 
and rheme. Thus, in (1), the evidential leads to an interpretation of the utterance as a 
single whole (gloss: ‘it so happened that Maro got married’), whereas use of the perfect 
in –ac would lead us to relate some property or event to the theme ‘Maro’. Likewise, as 
we have shown in (3) above, use of the perfect boils down to varying the predicate 
linked to a given theme, whereas the evidential expresses surprise at an observation 
construed as a whole. 
The only exception to this formal constraint are utterances where the contrastive element 
of P bears on linking a rheme to a specific theme. This is what happens in (10), where the 
unusual comma between subject and predicate explicitly segments the utterance: 
 
 (10)
 K’ičer miayn nšec’in, or geγi eresên inkac 18 tarekan lakotê , sewta êr k
ap−er Srapenc’ pztik harsin ew yačax aγbiwri čamban nazanin anc’nelown kë 
spasêr:  
‘Few people noticed that this 18-year-old scamp, scorned by the village had 
(EVID) fallen in love with daugher-in-law Srapian, and that he would often 
wait for his beauty on the way to the well.’ (Hamastegh, First Love) 
 
There is a contrast between the insignificant image of the boy and what is predicated of 
him: he has a love affair with the most coveted young lady of the village. This type of 
utterance would yield structures like ‘Tu sais, Paul, eh ben il s’est acheté une Mercedes!’ 
in spoken French. 
The complex narrative structure of (10) (evidential in a subordinate clause, indirect 
speech open to several interpretations: the contents can be attributed to the narrator as 
well as to rumor) makes it rather atypical, since most utterances containing an evidential 
are short, isolated, and typically found in spoken discourse. With regard to utterances in 
context, analysis of the Kasparian corpus confirms our claim: no examples with a pause 
between subject and predicate were found. On the contrary, one often finds utterances 
without a theme, e.g.: 
 
• Word order is inverted and the verb in the evidential is initial (whereas the canonical 
order in MWA is SOV) and bears clausal stress, while the rest of the utterance has 
the intonational contour of an interpolated or post-rhematic clause (low pitch and 
intensity and accelerated delivery after the falling tone). This is the case in (7) above, 
as well as in: 
 
[Looking for tools to fix the bicycle, S is going through some of her friend’s stuff. She finds a small 
purse and says] (S.K. 1/348) 
 (11) - Hmm, as anowšik ê, mor’c’er êi ays payowsakd/ [forget-EVID AUX1SG] 
  - ‘Hm, that’s cute, I’d forgotten (EVID) you had a purse like that !’ 
• Neither the subject nor the object is expressed, so the verb is in initial position. In this 
case, as in (11), the verb in the evidential has rising intonation, while the rest has the 
contour of an interpolation (cf. (8) supra, (18) infra). 
 
• The utterance has a clause-initial interrogative, as in (12), (13), (16) and (19). 
 
[S. is looking for some tools in a box, and comments on the objects she finds]. (S.K. 1/119) 
 (12) – Αsika inči? hamar ê, inčow? paher em as, čem giter inč k’ënen hetë:::  
     [why keep-EVID AUX1SG DEICT1] 
‘– What’s this for? Why have I kept (EVID) this, I don’t even know what it’s 
for…’ 
 
[Chatting over a drink] (S.K. 5b/40) 
(13) A. – We’ve hired a boat with the P’s and we’ll spend ten days on the Breton 
isles. 
B. – That’s nice ! 
C. - Ι?nčpês tasë ôr,  i?nč’  bateau varjer êk’ 
     [what boat hire-EVID AUX2PL] 
  C.     ‘Ten days? What kind of boat have you hired?’ 
 
In both utterances, the question word, due to its association with the evidential, suggests 
that there is no propositional content to justify the predication: (12) suggests there is no 
reason to keep such an object, while (13) suggests that a common boat is no place to 
stay for ten days. 
 
• When there is a constituent that could take on the role of theme, the evidential blocks 
a segmented realization, regardless of whether the possible theme is a subject (14), a 
locative (15) or an object (16): 
 
[Checking the bicycle lamps] (S.K. 1/556-558)  
 (14)  A. − Αs č’i var’ir kor hima al:  
   ‘This one, it’s no longer on (PROGR.).’ 
  B. − Αs inč’ow, amên inč’ teγn ê, inčow? č’i var’ir:   
    − ‘Why? Everything’s okay ; why won’t it work ?’ 
   A. − Lampë ov gitê awrower? ê:     
    [bulb-ARTDEF perhaps blow-EVID AUX3SG] 
     ‘Perhaps the bulb has blown.’ 
 (* − Lampë // ov gitê awrower? ê: ) 
 
[S is going to cut A’s hair. A shows he has recently given it a short trim himself, as it had grown a lot.] 
(S.K. 1/745) 
 (15)− K’ani? šabat’ eγaw ktrec’ir, šowtên k’erknnay kor, ha?, asteγ ančap’ erknc’e
r êr, tesar i?nč ëri, či tesar hos? [there much grow-EVID AUX-
PAST3SG] 
 - ‘How many weeks has it been since you last cut it; it grows so fast, doesn’t 
it? It had grown so much, didn’t you see what I did there, didn’t you see?’ 
   (* asteγ  // ančap’ erknc’er êr) 
 
[Chatting over a drink. B tells A he’s going to Italy and invites him to go with him.] (S.K. 5b/14) 
 (16) A. – ‘Me, me, until I get my papers, in my situation, I don’t leave the country 
to run about trying to get a visa at the last minute !’ 
  B. - Αmên  frontières−nerë haner en  douane−in, drami hamar ewropayi::: 
  [all borders remove-EVID AUX3PL.] 
- ‘The have removed all customs borders, because of the European 
currency…’  
A. - Ι?nč haner en:  
  ‘What have they removed (EVID)?’ 
  (* Αmên  frontières−nerë  // haner en ) 
 
Finally, the corpus reveals an affinity between the evidential and the progressive which 
squares well with our hypothesis. We have repeatedly stressed the commonalties 
between those languages where the evidential marker originates from an older perfect 
form. Moreover, it is well-known that certain languages express the contextual values 
the evidential can take on by means of the perfect (e.g. Classical Armenian, Eastern 
Armenian and also Persian). The main characteristic of the perfect in the tense systems 
where it exists—and where it often functions in opposition with a dynamic aorist—is 
that, even if it refers to a past event, it does not create a past narrative, but rather 
comments on the present: given that a past event took place, the perfect comments on 
the present by positing the relevance of the past event to the present situation. It seems 
quite plausible that this fundamental ‘commenting’ value served as the basis for the more 
specific values of the evidential in these languages, even though it later gave rise to a 
specialized morpheme. In MWA, the ‘comment’ value appears in another part of the 
verbal system, viz. in the postposed verb particle kor (which Eastern Armenian does not 
have). Cohen (1989:99) has already observed a formal parallelism between these two 
categories in certain Semitic languages, where the progressive is the non-completed 
modal counterpart of the perfect. It seems that in MWA, likewise, the progressive 
functions as the non-completed counterpart of the perfect (of which the evidential is 
simply a specialized form). The progressive cannot simply be reduced to a processual and 
durative aspectual category. Granted that in French, ‘être en train de’ has a modal value 
besides an aspectual one25, the former is even more pronounced in MWA. The 
compatibility of the progressive with stative verbs, as shown in (17), and even with 
‘know’, as shown in (20) clearly shows that it is different from the French and English 
progressives in that it is more modalized. It is also noteworthy that kor is not 
incompatible with the generic present26. 
The corpus shows that there is a strong affinity between the progressive and the 
evidential: in (15) above, the same verb appears twice in the same sequence, first in the 
progressive (to refer to a non-completed process: ‘the hair is growing fast’) and then in 
the evidential (referring to a completed event: ‘it has grown a lot’). In (17), the narrative 
in the present contains a lot of progressives, before an evidential appears: 
 
[S is telling how, one day, she was very tired when she returned home by bike. Yet, out of pride, she 
forced herself to pedal all the way, without getting off the bike. But when she got to a steep rise very 
near her home] (S.K. 1/444) 
 (17) − Οdk’ers čem zgar kor, vélo−n minakë k’alê kor , quoi, au ralenti, 1 km/h, 
ov gitê asank, ouin, kamac’ kamac’ asank, mer’er êi, verj’ên Parc Montsouris 
hasay  nê, ësi owzacnin ësen, k’ij’nam: 
- ‘I can’t feel-PROGR my feet anymore, the bike moves- PROGR all by itself… 
so… very slow, 1 km/h, like that… I was dead [had die-EVID]; finally I got 
to Parc Montsouris; I said let them say whatever they want, I’m getting off.’ 
 
Similarly, in (18) 
[Inspection of the bicycle’s lamps: A turns the wheels, while B and C inspect the front and back lamps] 
(S.K. 1/538-542) 
 (18) B. - Voilà, voilà atika var’ec’aw ‘Look, look, this one is on [shine-AOR].’ 
  A. − Var’i kor? ‘It’s on [shine-PROGR.]?’ 
 B. - Ηa/, ha/, var’er ê ‘Yeah, yeah, it’s on [shine-EVID]!’ 
 C.− Εtewinë var’er ê ‘The one at the back is on [shine-EVID]!’ 
 
the verb (‘it is shining’), appearing first in the aorist, is repeated in the progressive to ask 
for confirmation (‘is it really on?’ literally: ‘is it shining?’) and finally in the evidential 
(‘yes indeed, it is really on!’). Likewise in (14) above, the first observation (the 
adversative ‘look here, it’s no longer on’) is in the progressive. If one wanted to describe 
the same factual situation in terms of a completed process, one could have used in the 
same context: marer ê [go out-EVID, AUX3SG], as in (19): 
 
[Trying to fasten the brake shoes] (S.K. 1/703) 
(19) - No, that’s the problem, this black thing, because it’s over here, it can’t go 
there. 
 - This one’s fallen too. 
 - Watch what you’re doing. 
 - Damned! 
 − Ιnčpês eγer ê hos eker ê asi         
 [how be-EVID AUX3SG here come-EVID AUX3SG DEICT1] 
  ‘How did this end up [become-EVID] over here [come-EVID]?’ 
 
If (19) is modified so that the second verb is present, the evidential becomes a 
progressive (− Ιnčpês eγer ê hos kow gay kor asi). Compare also (20): 
 
[On the phone, planning where and when to meet to go out that evening; A is on the phone, while B is 
asking him questions in order to follow what’s being said] (S.K. 2b/5) 
 (20) A. – Hello, yes … 
   B. Is it P? 
   A. Yeah, yeah. 
   B. What’s he saying? 
A. >em giter kor, Ρ−in č’enk’ krnar kor gtnel, amen aten occupé ê kam al 
débranché ërer en ::: 
‘I don’t know-PROGR, we can’t-PROGR get hold of R, it’s always busy or 
disconnected [made-EVID disconnected].’ 
 
Here, both verbs, one in the progressive (‘we can’t get hold of her’), the other in the 
evidential (‘they have disconnected the phone’) function on the same level: they are 
juxtaposed and evoke similar subjective values, the first with reference to a non-
completed, the second with reference to a completed event. The link is even clearer in :  
 
[A couple lazing away in bed. She is thinking out loud (isolated utterance)] (S.K. 9/42) 
 (21) Αs fatalité−n mezi erkowk’nis irarow kaper ê xntay kor vranis:  
‘This fate, it has brought-EVID the two of us together, (and) it’s mocking-
PROGR us.’ 
 
where the progressive and evidential are juxtaposed without an intervening conjunction. 
It would be interesting to analyze the functions of the MWA progressive in kor, which 
seems to convey a modal value quite close to that of the evidential, in that the speaker 
recognizes the existence of a competing viewpoint which is activated by the context or 
the situation. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but it could elucidate 
the evidential’s position within the MWA verb system using criteria that are quite 
different from those used in the traditional analyses of the marker in neighboring 
languages. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have attempted to present a semasiological treatment of the evidential category by 
analyzing its specific marker in MWA. This approach has confirmed the points raised in 
the first part of this paper, viz.: 
1. The hypothesis centered around the ‘source of knowledge’, which lies at the heart of 
the notion of ‘evidential’ is both theoretically disputable and unable in practice to 
provide a unified treatment of the way the MWA marker of this category functions. 
2. The hypothesis centered around given vs. new information and surprise (DeLancey), 
or ‘sideration’ (Danon-Boileau), though it is theoretically more satisfactory, cannot 
account for all the different uses attested in our corpus of spoken MWA either. 
 
The enunciative hypothesis we propose is based on a fairly abstract schema which allows 
us to predict the entire range of values (objective, subjective, emotional, interactional) as 
a function of parameters that are, broadly speaking, contextual (factual situation, 
presuppositions, discourse participant, shared knowledge, speaker attitude, but also 
lexical elements, the kind of process involved, intonation, etc.). Thus, it illustrates several 
theoretical options: 
1. the need to explain linguistic phenomena in terms of concepts which are specific to 
linguistic activity (rather than tied to cognitive activity in general), especially when 
these phenoma involve the use of a specific grammatical marker, as in our MWA 
data. 
2. the refusal to group the different semantico-pragmatic values evoked by a category 
into a hierarchy having both central/prototypical and peripheral/derived values—such 
hierarchies, when used in typological linguistics, being most of the time intuitive 
rather than based on explicit criteria. 
3. the refusal to separate discursive (or pragmatic) phenomena from morphosyntactic 
phenomena in the analysis of a marker. 
 
We believe that our hypothesis also provides a valuable heuristic tool, in that: 
1. From a descriptive viewpoint, it is superior to earlier theories, as shown by our 
corpus analysis. 
2. From the viewpoint of linguistic typology, or more generally, the study of linguistic 
universals and cross-linguistic variability, recourse to the notion of enunciation 
allows us to embed the theory on the evidential into a general theory on assertion, 
which might shed light on the difference between ‘neutral’ assertions in languages 
having an evidential category and those lacking one. 
3. Finally, in tackling the analysis of the category in enuciative rather than referential or 
iconic terms (cf. the cognitive hypothesis’ focus on the circumstances under which 
the speaker has gathered the information s/he communicates) our hypothesis permits 
us to embed the analysis of the evidential into a global analysis of temporal-aspectual 
and modal categories (cf. the links we observed with both the perfect and the 
progressive) and can thus shed new light on the analysis of these categories. 
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1 There are two standard forms of Modern Armenian: Eastern Armenian, the official language of the 
Republic of Armenia, also spoken by the Armenians of Iran and Western Armenian, the standard 
language of the Ottoman Empire until 1915, now spoken in Armenian communities throughout the 
world. 
2 French term ‘énonciation’, introduced by Benveniste and Culioli, is sometimes translated to english as 
‘uttering act’. We prefer to remain closer to the original term, and speak about ‘enunciation’, as done in 
the english edition of Culioli’s seminar published by J. Benjamins in 1995. 
3 For a dialectological survey, historical account and analysis of the position within the MWA verb 
system of the forms under discussion, see Donabédian (1996b, 1999). 
4 For the transcription of Armenian, we make use of the Hübschmann-Meillet-Benveniste transliteration, 
which is widely used by Armenologists, even though it is not the best system to transcribe Western 
Armenian pronunciation. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 We do not follow Kozintseva (1997), who posits the existence of an evidential category in Eastern 
Armenian, since the semantic values commonly associated with evidentiality are not tied to a specific 
marker in this language, but rather associated with the perfect under certain contextual and intonational 
conditions. 
6 Where the distinction between perfect and evidential can depend on the category of person. 
7 See Chafe & Nichols (1986) and Guentchéva (1996). 
8 Though there is a particle ε=ερ, which is compatible with any predicate, its values are more restricted 
than those of the –er paradigm. This will be the subject of future work. 
9 The evidential marker has its own aspectual characteristics (as discussed in Donabédian 1998) which 
may, in certain contexts, coincide with those of the perfect or the aorist. 
10 ARTDEF/ARTINDEF = definite/indefinite article; AUX = auxiliary; 1,2,3 = person (verbs) or degree 
(deixis); SG/PL = number; EVID = evidential; PFT = perfect; POSS = possessive; PROGR = 
progressive; PRST = present; AOR = aorist; DEICT = deictic; [text] = glosses/literal translations; italics 
= original text; ‘text’ = translation. 
11 Jean-Pierre Desclés has suggested that this operation is an instance of abduction rather than inference. 
But regardless of its precise status, such a description still involves an appeal to logical thought. Note, 
however, that what is asserted is only the phenomenon ‘rain’ and not the logical operation itself, which 
is contextual.  
12 To be taken in the sense of Fitneva (this volume), who explicitly opposes ‘cognitive hypothesis’ to 
‘speaker’s attitude’, i.e. an approach that focusses on how the information conveyed by the utterance is 
acquired rather than on the conditions and various options available to the speaker which lead to the 
production of an utterance in context. 
13 Guenthéva prefers this term (coined by Lazard 1956) over ‘evidential’ for reasons we subscribe to. 
First, in French, where the word ‘evidence’ has a different meaning than its English equivalent 
‘evidence’, it is a misnomer. Second, it implies a purely onomasiological approach, which we will 
criticize in what follows. In our previous works, we have consistently used the term ‘mediative’. Here, 
we will use the term ‘evidential’ to bring our terminology closer to standard conventions and to avoid 
the impression that the Armenian category we describe is in any way different from that labeled 
‘evidential’ in the languages mentioned earlier, which would considerably weaken our claims. 
14 , ‘The mediatized utterance’, title of the 1996 volume. 
15 See the papers on these languages in Chafe & Nichols (1986) and Guentcheva (1996). 
16 The ‘mythic narration’ value being a variant of the latter.  
17 Note that this work is also corpus-based. 
18 It is no coincidence that our analysis grew out of the comparison of a segmental morphological marker 
in MWA and a prosodic marker in Russian, as the latter is also limited to spoken language and its main 
function goes beyond the transmission of information. 
19 The canonical stress pattern in Russian is sentence-final. 
20 For reasons of space, we refer the reader to the references for illustrative examples of these values. 
21 This kind of assertion is presented here as typical only in that it provides a convenient standard in 
comparison to which evidential utterances stand out clearly. An exhaustive account of the evidential 
would obviously require it to be integrated into a general theory of assertion, which is not available at 
present. Consequently, our use of the notion ‘typical’ assertion is simply provisional and has no 
theoretical status whatsoever. 
22 The corpus used here was compiled and transcribed by S. Kasparian for her dissertation on code 
switching among Armenians living in Paris (Kasparian 1992). Recorded MWA material is scarce, due 
to the fact that the linguistic competence of speakers tends to decline rapidly in the diaspora. 
Furthermore, isolated utterances are hard to gather, as they require extensive recording. The corpus is 
suitable for our purposes, since the interactions recorded seem to favor the occurrence of evidentials 
(over 35 instances in approximately three hours of speech). In our opinion (confirmed by native 
speakers) the abundance of loan words and alternations with French do not affect the pragmatic and 
morphosyntactic reliability of the data. It is, moreover, significant that code switching with French do 
not affect the frequency of evidential in this corpus. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
23 Since the auxiliaries are marked for person, the utterance would be grammatical without the 
pronouns. Their presence is therefore marked. 
24 We do not interpret the theme/rheme distinction in terms of the semantics of the predication (which 
would allow every subject constituent to be regarded as a thematic), but rather in terms of the 
enunciative organisation of the message (cf. Bonnot (1997) where every utterance which does not allow 
a pause between its subject and predicate is considered to be entirely rhematic). 
25 Cf. examples like ‘Mais qu’est-ce que tu es en train de faire?’, ‘Tu vois bien que je suis en train de 
travailler!’, mentioned in Franckel (1989:174-176) as illustrative of the progressive’s capability to evoke 
‘disagreement’. 
26 One might wonder whether ‘progressive’ is the right term for these cases. Yet it is precisely in the 
absence of lexical and contextual constraints that kor acquires this value, just like the past in –er 
acquires an ‘evidential’ value in the absence of lexical and contextual constraints. Thus, even if we 
admit that the definitions of both the evidential and the progressive still need elaboration, we will 
provisionally stick to these labels. In fact, to the extent that the phenomena we describe are identical to 
those subsumed under the respective labels in numerous other languages, our use of the labels 
‘evidential’ and ‘progressive’ facilitates a comparison with data and theories from research on language 
universals and cross-linguistic variability. In a framework where the singularity of the marker is the 
basis of the search for a single fundamental operation (which will inevitably be rather abstract) notional 
labels like ‘progressive’ or ‘evidential’ can ultimately be nothing more than a matter of convention, 
since they can never replace an exhaustive description of the marker in question. 
